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CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION LAW &
REGULATION
Ryan M. F. Baron, Glen Price, and Benjamin Bodell†
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this special topic is to provide a summary of the
laws and regulations associated with the development of Community
Choice Aggregation (“CCA”) in California and the growing impact of
CCA in the California energy market.
In 2000–2001, California experienced a devastating energy crisis
due to deregulation, capped electricity prices, a shortage of supply,
and market manipulation, resulting in multiple large-scale blackouts
and extreme prices. In response to the crisis, the California Legislature
passed several bills to bring order to California’s energy markets. The
Legislature provided an energy procurement alternative—community
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.15
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choice aggregation1—that allows California cities and counties, and
groups of cities and counties through separate local government
agencies known as “joint powers authorities,”2 to opt their residents
and commercial and industrial businesses out of receiving retail
electricity from the investor owned utility (“IOU”) and directly control
and provide retail power at the local level.3 This legislation sparked a
significant movement by local governments in California to provide
retail electricity to their residents and businesses without having to
form municipal utilities and take over the IOU transmission and
distribution system.
CCA allows local agencies to aggregate the electric load of its
jurisdiction and provide electricity to those residents, businesses, and
municipal accounts within the CCA’s municipal boundaries. Under
the CCA model, local government entities take over the retail function
of an electric utility by procuring and generating power and providing
it to ratepayers, while IOUs continue to provide electric transmission,
distribution, utility line maintenance, and metering and billing
services. The CCA model offers a new entry point into the California
energy landscape for cities and communities while providing
consumer choice,4 competitive rates, local control, economic
development, and climate-related benefits by increasing the
development of renewable energy, particularly in a market that has
been traditionally controlled by vertically integrated, natural
monopolies.
Recent innovations in energy technology and resultant lower costs,
as well as incremental policies encouraging renewable energy
resource adoption, have led California on a path towards a diversified
market for consumer electric services.5 The California Public Utilities
Commission (“CPUC”) estimated that within the next decade over
85% of retail load in California will be served by alternative sources.6
1. AB 117, 2001-2002 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2002); see Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 366.2.
Community choice aggregation is more popularly known as community choice
energy.
2. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6500 (2012) (California Joint Exercise of Powers Act).
3. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2 (2020).
4. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2(c)(13) (2020). Consumer choice is provided
by allowing the CCA customer the ability to opt out of service and return to IOU
service.
5. Rooftop solar, Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) and Direct Access
providers (ESPs), which are effectively non-IOU unbundled providers, served over
25% of California’s retail electric load in 2019 and 2020.
6. Robert Walton, California PUC Staff: Non-Utility Suppliers Could Serve
85% of Load by Mid-2020s, UTILITYDIVE (May 17, 2017),
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California faces numerous challenges and opportunities in developing
a coherent plan to integrate and manage the growth of CCAs and
diversified energy provision, including renewable procurement rules,
resource adequacy requirements, and consumer protection.
II. EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In 2010, Marin Clean Energy (MCE) launched the first CCA in
California,7 and Sonoma Clean Power followed suit in 2014.8 These
and other CCAs demonstrated a model that has the potential to yield
substantial benefits to communities and customers, including reduced
prices and higher rates of renewable resource utilization. As a result,
CCA formation increased dramatically across California in recent
years, with many new CCAs launching throughout the state.
Twenty-one CCAs now exist in the territory of the three major IOUs
in California,9 with many additional communities planning formation
or investigating membership.10 As of September 2020, these twentyone CCAs account for nearly ten million customer accounts, an
increase of approximately 40% since the end of 2017.11
The rapid departure of IOU customers to CCAs led the CPUC to
adopt CCA registration timelines and requirements that CCAs
participate in state energy planning proceedings to ensure grid
reliability and the fair allocation of capacity obligations. Other issues
also exist, such as the increasing volatility of utility “exit fees” and
challenges with CCAs obtaining sufficient credit for long-term energy
transactions.

https://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-puc-staff-non-utility-suppliers-couldserve-85-of-load-by-mid-/442897/ [https://perma.cc/B5V5-SNK5].
7. Alexandra McGee, Marin Clean Energy Startup Timeline and Funding,
MCE
(February
8,
2016),
https://www.mcecleanenergy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/MCE-Start-Up-Timeline-and-Initial-Funding-Sources-106-14-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK3N-K2N9].
8. Sonoma Clean Power Officially “Flips the Switch”, SONOMA CLEAN POWER
(May 1, 2014), https://sonomacleanpower.org/uploads/documents/Sonoma-CleanPower-Begins-Serving-Customers-050114-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72NDLFWR].
9. This includes Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and San
Diego Gas & Electric. 2010-2020: A Decade of CCA in California, CALCCA (May
1,
2020),
httpsa://cal-cca.org/celebrating-10-years-of-cca-in-california/
[https://perma.cc/9WST-YNR6].
10. CALCCA, https://cal-cca.org/ [https://perma.cc/SFG2-BP9T] (last visited
Jan. 19, 2020).
11. Id.
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A. Renewable Resource Integration & California Regulatory Policy
While deregulation coupled with market fragmentation has the
potential to lead to another energy crisis,12 the CPUC has taken an
aggressive stance towards CCA regulation through a broad
interpretation of its duty to regulate CCAs under the Public Utilities
Code. California Public Utility Code Section 366.2 forms the statutory
framework for CCA regulation by the CPUC and pronounces that
CCAs have the independent authority to procure electricity for its
jurisdictional customers.13 However, a CCA must submit an
implementation plan to the CPUC, which demonstrates the ability to
provide reliable, universal service in conformance with all state
laws.14 Furthermore, the CPUC is vested with the duty to prevent cost
shifting and promote ratepayer indifference by ensuring that CCA
customer departure does not increase costs for customers that remain
with the IOU and that the IOUs do not improperly pass along costs to
CCA customers that should stay with the IOUs.15
1. Resource Adequacy and CCA Implementation
The CPUC’s resource adequacy mandates require all load-serving
entities (electricity providers), which includes CCAs, to procure
sufficient capacity to supply electricity to all of their customers during
periods of maximum electricity demand for the upcoming year.
Because electricity demand (including peak demand) fluctuates,
electricity providers must ensure that a cushion amount of electricity
(a “reserve margin”) is capable of being generated at any given time,
even though it might not be needed. The purpose of resource adequacy
is to provide an additional safety net in the event of an unforeseen
spike in power demand. Thus, all electricity providers must obtain
capacity commitments that are greater than peak electricity demand.16

12. See e.g., MICHAEL COLVIN, DIANE I. FELLMAN, RAISA LEDESMA
RODRIGUEZ, CPUC STAFF, CALIFORNIA CUSTOMER CHOICE: AN EVALUATION OF
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OPTIONS FOR AN EVOLVING ELECTRICITY MARKET
(Rohimah Moly ed.) (2018).
13. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2(a) (2019).
14. § 366.2(c)
15. § 366.2(a), (c) (2019).
16. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 04-01-050, at pp. 20-27, ORDER
INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO ESTABLISH POLICIES AND COST RECOVERY
MECHANISMS FOR GENERATION PROCUREMENT AND RENEWABLE RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT (2001) (CPUC Policy Requires LSE’s to secure Capacity
commitments 15% greater than peak load.)
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The surge of CCA formation since 2016 has shifted load from IOUs
to CCAs in rapid fashion.17 In addressing the rapid expansion of
CCAs, the CPUC now requires CCAs to submit load forecasts and
year ahead resource adequacy filings if they plan to serve new or
additional load in the subsequent calendar year.18 The CPUC also
mandated a longer resource adequacy procurement cycle, which
requires all electricity providers to procure a certain percentage of
local resource commitments up to three years ahead at the beginning
of each cycle. This long-term procurement cycle, in which the CPUC
proposes to utilize an independent buyer, will presumably impose
additional costs on all electricity providers and strip CCAs of some of
their independent energy procurement authority.19
2. Energy Procurement and Resource Planning Regulations
a. Renewables Portfolio Standard Procurement Plans
CCAs must file Renewables Portfolio Standard (“RPS”)
procurement plans with the CPUC that demonstrate compliance with
the state’s renewable energy targets under Senate Bill 350. CCA RPS
procurement plans must include project status and progress updates,
notice of potential compliance delays, and an assessment of portfolio
diversity as it relates to grid integration and under-utilization of
17. See Jeff St. John, How Community Choice Aggregation Fits Into California’s
Clean
Energy
Future,
GREENTECH
MEDIA
(Sept.
12,
2018),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-community-choiceaggregation-fits-into-californias-clean-energy-future
[https://perma.cc/WF5SXDQG].
18. CPUC Proposal Would Require CCAs to Coordinate with Resource
Adequacy Program, California Public Utilities Commission News Blog (Feb. 5,
2018),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/cpucblog.aspx?id=6442455641&blogid=1551
[https://perma.cc/W3KZ-MZXH].
19. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 18-06-030, at 32, ORDER INSTITUTING
RULEMAKING TO OVERSEE THE RESOURCE ADEQUACY PROGRAM, CONSIDER
PROGRAM REFINEMENTS, AND ESTABLISH ANNUAL LOCAL AND FLEXIBLE
PROCUREMENT OBLIGATIONS FOR THE 2019 AND 2020 COMPLIANCE YEARS (2018)
(“Weighing both the concerns and the potential benefits of moving to a central buyer
system, we believe that a central buyer system - for at least some portion of local
RA - is the solution most likely to provide cost efficiency, market certainty,
reliability, administrative efficiency, and customer protection . . . central
procurement of system or flexible RA may be considered in future years.”); MEGAN
SOMOGYI ET AL., New CPUC Regulation of Community Choice Aggregators,
LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES 15 (2018) https://www.cacities.org/ResourcesDocuments/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/CityAttorneys/Library/2018/AC-PPTS-and-Papers/9-2018-AC%3B-Somogyi-NewCPUC-Regulation-of-Communit.aspx [https://perma.cc/7Y89-V2M5].
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renewable resources.20 Plans should also demonstrate how RPS
portfolios optimize cost consideration, value, and risk for the benefit
of customers.21
b. Integrated Resource Plans
CCAs must comply with the long-term energy planning mandates
under SB 350 by filing an integrated resource plan (“IRP”) with the
CPUC.22 The CPUC’s integrated resource planning process takes a
long-term (ten years) planning approach to system needs (reliability
needs of the overall electric system), local needs (reliability needs
specific to areas with transmission limitations), and flexibility needs
(such as the resources needed to integrate renewables). The
Commission requires IRP plans to ensure long-term portfolio
optimization that balances greenhouse gas reduction with cost and
reliability considerations. In a recent determination, the CPUC held
that CCAs must substantively comply with state IRP requirements.23
B. Additional Legal and Financial Considerations
1. The Power Charge Indifference Adjustment
On October 11, 2018, the CPUC unanimously adopted a
precedential decision reforming the power charge indifference
adjustment (“PCIA”) methodology. The PCIA is a methodology used
by the IOUs to determine the “exit fee” or charge customers of CCAs
and other departing load customers pay to cover the generation costs
acquired before the customers’ change in service provider. State law
requires that customers of IOUs and CCAs remain financially
20. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13 (2020); PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION
R.15-02-020, at 9, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONTINUE
IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION, AND CONSIDER FURTHER DEVELOPMENT,
OF CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM (2018).
21. Id.
22. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 18-02-018 at pp. 25-29, ORDER
INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO DEVELOP AN ELECTRICITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE
PLANNING FRAMEWORK AND TO COORDINATE AND REFINE LONG-TERM
PROCUREMENT PLANNING REQUIREMENTS (2018) (“We maintain that our authority
and responsibility over CCA planning is considerably broader than the CCAs and
their representatives argue.”).
23. Id. at 26. Moreover, the Commission determined that if a CCA does not meet
the statutory or Commission requirements, it has the authority to order long-term
procurement commitments, and to assign costs of non-performance to meet the
identified needs for renewable integration in accordance with Public Utility Code
Section 454.51.
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indifferent when a customer departs for the service of another
electricity provider. Currently, customers that choose to take service
with a CCA pay a charge on their electric bill to offset the costs that
the IOU has incurred on that customer’s behalf. This practice prevents
cost shifting and ensures that remaining IOU-bundled customers are
indifferent to and do not incur additional costs due to departing load.
The PCIA also prevents IOUs from unfairly shifting costs to CCA
customers.
The IOUs’ PCIA-eligible portfolios are made up of both capital
expenditures for retired nuclear and fossil fuel generation as well as
long-term contracts for renewable energy executed during the infancy
of the California renewables market. Increased market scale and
technological advancements caused a steep drop in the cost of
renewable resources in the past decade. Older contracts (and their
related PCIA costs) come at a substantial mark up from today’s market
prices.
In a unanimous decision, the five CPUC Commissioners adopted a
PCIA calculation methodology that allows IOU legacy generation
assets, like Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and hydroelectric
facilities, to be included in the PCIA methodology. The PCIA decision
also included true-up mechanism for PCIA collections based on the
actual net costs of IOU resources and rejected a ten-year limit on
recovery of post-2002 UOG assets, which would have limited IOU
cost recovery. The adopted PCIA will result in hundreds of millions
of dollars in additional costs to CCA customers.
Creditworthiness is also a substantial hurdle to long-term energy
procurement for CCAs, and Credit Rating Agencies have taken note
of the risks created by the PCIA decision. In 2020, CCAs will need to
procure a significant amount of power through long-term contracts of
ten or more years, as required by state law, to hedge against
uncertainty and potential market volatility. With the recent PCIA
decision squeezing out some of the savings to the customer along with
credit constraints resulting from the COVID-19 international
pandemic, it may be difficult in the short-term for some CCAs to
generate the reserve margins required to establish a favorable credit
rating and obtain credit at reasonable rates.

